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ABSTRACT

Boone, Seth C. M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. A County Level Analysis of 2014
Farm Bill Commodity Payments. Major Professor: Roman Keeney.
United States commodity policy was subject to a large transition in how the
federal government supports agricultural producers when the 2014 Farm Bill was passed
in February of 2014. The new programs are the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and
the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs. Methods used by the federal government to
distribute farm income support have evolved from constant decoupled payments into
programs that respond to agricultural market fluctuations, delivering payments that are
inversely related to market performance.
The United States has a long history of government programs directly and
indirectly supporting farmers and their income, dating back to the Great Depression and
Dust Bowl eras. Over this time, the objectives of farm policy have had to meet varying
needs, and have endured numerous iterations from their onset to today. Most recently the
reforms of the 2014 Farm Bill redirected farm payments from constant income transfers
to countercyclical payments which mimic insurance indemnities by paying out only when
certain financial stress thresholds are met for a given area of the country.
This thesis offers a study of 92 counties in Indiana covering corn, soybean, and
wheat crop production representing the majority of Indiana crop revenue. The analysis

viii
predicts payment rates by county for the scheduled life of the 2014 Farm Bill commodity
programs, 2014-2018. We adopt a baseline approach for extending the analysis forward
beyond the period of known prices and yields, opting to calculate a relatively stable path
analysis of programs under forecast equilibrium. This offers the advantage of seeing how
  





       

 

 

  



basis in moving averages of revenue components.
The 2014 and 2015 known payments are of considerable interest across the
different crops in Indiana, providing the full range of outcomes and allowing direct
contrast in payment streams for different counties. The scope of the analysis and the
     

   

     

    

allows for some generalizations on the efficacy of th  ! " # 

 

 

their

support to agricultural producers and their ability to limit federal budget outlays. In both
cases we focus on per acre payment rates at the county level against Direct Payments.
Our focus on payment rates gives us a basic unit for analysis that both facilitates
decomposition into the factors that influence the payment rate as well as leaving aside the
issues involved with appropriate aggregation methods over heterogeneous population
with limited data. The analysis shows that the three crops in Indiana can generalize to 3
cases when comparing the two new programs (ARC and PLC) to the replaced direct
payments (DP) but that these generalizations mask some distributional issues that occur
in payment rates at the county level. The decomposition of payment rates among multiple
dimensions (prices, yields, counties, programs, and time) permits examination of the full
set of potential economic and political consequences of current and future instances of
commodity support policy.

1

CHAPTER 1. FOREWORD

The commodity title of the 2014 farm bill features two primary support programs
designed to support farm incomes when individual commodity markets decline,
Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC)1. The 2014 farm
 

                  

  

producers to choose program coverage as well as for its thematic reversion to direct
linkages between current market performance and payment levels. The timing of the
2014 farm bill adds an additional note of interest as it marks the turning point from high
market prices that persisted t          
The strong price performance immediately preceding the 2014 farm bill is
particularly notable in the case of the ARC program, which is tied to a set of recent
historical prices and yields with its moving average calculation. The role of these
historical yields and prices on average and in the timing of when they occur has a
profound effect on the path that support payments take through time. Additionally, the
use of yields in the payment calculation introduces spatial variability such that county
productivity and variability are instrumental in determining eligibility for program

A third income support program named Agricultural Risk Coverage  Individual (ARC-I) was also
introduced in the 2014 farm bill. This program is designed around whole farm support rather than being
commodity specific. This program had limited sign-up and is not generally comparable on anything but a
case farm basis. This thesis maintains county level payment rates as the unit of analysis leaving little room
to provide conclusions with regard to that program.

1

2
support in any given year. These stand in stark contrast to the PLC program which sets
statutory price floors for each crop that do not respond to changing market or production
conditions.
This thesis consists of two papers each pursuing a different aim for understanding
  

 





 

      

  

   

discourse on the history of commodity support policy in the United States. This discourse
aims to identify the major tonal shifts in farm support policy and the market conditions to
which program design responds. Upon arriving at the significant shift in policy approach
offered by the 2014 Farm Bill, the paper concludes with some thoughts about
expectations for the future design of government support in agriculture.
This is immediately followed with the 2nd paper which offers an investigation into
the distributional implications of the 2014 Farm Bill. The paper identifies five
dim  
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and PLC. These include two dimensions specific to the signup process (crop and program
dimensions) and two dimensions that arise from agricultural performance both relative to
program defined benchmarks (yield and price dimensions). The final construct is in many
ways a measure of how the previous four interact through the life of the program (time
dimension).
The two papers in this thesis are written in standalone fashion so that a proper
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 #$ %  #      

sections of chapter 2 and chapter 3 respectively. While the essays denoted chapter 2 and 3
are intended to stand alone, they are bound by a thematic thread of trying to understand
and inform policy maker actions and responses.

3
Policy objectives within omnibus farm legislation are increasingly diverse. The
long history of farm policy reform efforts is marked by a high disposition for political
response to current economic conditions, often through the use of interstitial assistance in
times of marked distress. At the conclusion of chapter 2 it is observed that a critical aim
  

   

           

formalizing the dependency of the rate of payments to the relative performance of the
sector. This observation provides a natural bridge to chapter 3 which will examine the
effectiveness of 2014 Farm Bill mechanisms with an eye toward some distributional
consequences and their interactions that may exert unanticipated political pressures.

1.1: Explaining Payment Estimations for Indiana over Space and Time
Chapter three provides the estimation of program payments, followed by an
analysis of the prices and yields components for select cases to show the variability than
can occur in fairly localized settings under ARC. The first step is calculating the expected
relative price support in PLC vs ARC and reviewing the role that played in differential
crop enrollment across programs in Indiana. From there, the examination of yield effect
   

     

          

                      



revenue level that triggers payments. For example, two counties will have the same low
national price for corn used in their ARC calculation but will differ in payment by their
yield factor (current yield relative to historical). If one county has a strong enough yield
to overcome the price factor so that revenue remains above the benchmark, that revenue
performance will be carried forward providing a (relatively) stronger support basis for

4
subsequent years. By definition a county that receives a payment in one year will be
lowering its supported revenue level in subsequent years. Examining the varied cases that
         

              

fodder for comparison and developing some general findings on relative program
performance.

1.2: Policy effectiveness: Income Support and Public Spending
The relevant point of comparison for ARC and PLC payments is the foregone
direct payment program that supported US agriculture with fixed transfers independent of
market outcomes for nearly twenty years. The potential for program funds to support
farm income is increasingly limited in the general sense and requires a high resolution
examination of farm types to identify those farms where support programs are relevant to
the net profitability margin over multiple years. Analysis of farm payment usage during
the era of decoupled direct payment support showed a variety of uses made of those
       

    

payment check,        



             
   

  

reform to a countercyclical basis (payments inversely related to market performance)
means that our best measure (absent the distributional incidence) for placing new
programs on a relative basis is the assumed continuation of a constant DP payment rate.
Adopting the DP as a point of comparison readily highlights the role of
fluctuating versus constant payments. Additionally, it provides some insight on potential
program costs vis-à-vis a continuation of the DP program as the primary commodity
program outlay. As debate on 2014 farm bill reached its ultimate resolution there were

5
   





    

   

 





identical payments being made year over year even when farm incomes were growing.
The second was the level of spending on commodity entitlements. It is clear that the
reform track favored the variable payments at the expense of spending as the new
counter-cyclical programs increase budget exposure in the commodity title such that
relatively strong and consistent market performance would be required to lead to reduced
commodity title spending. Most national baseline projections currently indicate that
commodity title spending will increase over the five-year life of the bill significantly, a




counties.
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CHAPTER 2: AN EXAMINATION OF HISTORICAL US COMMODITY SUPPORT

The roots of U.S. commodity programs can be traced to the economic conditions
  





 

   

of 

   

approach to federal government policy. Farm programs or commodity support are
generally defined as the set of federal instruments that insulate farmers from market
losses or provide direct income support in the form of a monetary payment. The initial
farm programs enacted under Roosevelt set the stage for some sixty years of support in
agriculture by providing farmers insulation from downside market outcomes in exchange
for some participation requirements that limit total crop supply.
These limitations on supply control took many forms and represents the first big
idea in commodity support defining farm support from its onset to 1996. The consistent
activity of the government as an intervening agent in agricultural markets was
understandably a complicating factor for those who rely on market signals for profit
making decisions. The marginal success and the consistent need for overhaul of program
mechanisms over time led to decreasing reliance on supply control as the end of the 20 th
century neared and the supply control era officially ended in 1996. In that year, the
government ended all market based purchase and stockholding and shifted programmatic
support in agriculture to the second big idea, decoupled support. Decoupled in

7
agricultural support is a term that has come to mean government payments that are not
impacted by current market performance or on-farm decisions.
The first decoupled payments instituted in the US were fully decoupled using
historical factors to determine payments levels on a per acre basis with no response to
market factors. Moving forward from 1996, different forms of decoupled payments were
instituted some of which were only decoupled from on-farm decisions with payment
levels that respond to annual market prices. The experiment with decoupled support was
marked by two things: first of these was allowing significant flexibility for farmers to
respond in their production decisions without having to consider payment eligibility
implications and second is a high rate of emergency support being required in different
years where markets plummeted. In 1999 and 2000, record low prices spurred emergency
support in agriculture at rates large enough to set record levels of government payments
(in nominal spending dollars) during those years despite a set of policies designed to
ignore market performance.
We define the end of the decoupling era as 2014, when the US eliminated all
fixed direct payments. These payments were the hallmark of 1996 policy and ironically it
was the fact that these fixed direct payments continued despite record farm income
performance that made them politically untenable. As the US economy struggled through
recession and budget crisis in 2011 and 2012 farm incomes thrived and put direct
payment support on notice for elimination with no meaningful legislative champion
arguing for their maintenance. The passage of the 2014 farm bill sets the modern big idea
of agricultural commodity support, featuring as its big idea insurance-like countercyclical
support that deters the need for emergency support. In the sections that follow we discuss

8
the historical track of US commodity support in detail, noting the several reform efforts
and how past mechanisms inform expectations about performance of the 2014 farm bill.

  

                 

meeting expectations, avoiding unintended consequences, and sustaining agricultural
income in a manner consistent with policy objectives.

2.1: Commodity Program History Prior to 1996
The period from 1909 to 1914, sometimes known as the Golden Age, established
the first modern era of sustained prosperity in US agriculture. As the weight of other
social, political, and other economic factors brought downturns and increased uncertainty
back to US agriculture, the first notions of adopting a public policy approach for
sustaining agricultural incomes arrived (Bean and Bollinger 1939; Boulding 1947). The
earliest experiment in US commodity support traces to 1919/1920 when low agricultural
prices led to the

             

legislation to regulate stocks, freight costs and credit conditions while promoting
cooperatives (Gardner 2009). This period also marks the first use of the term parity, a
belief that the five-year period preceding 1914 represented the proper returns to
agriculture and that declines in agriculture were the result of outside forces intruding on
agricultural market performance illegitimately.
Following the CAI report, private industry and select senators began to develop
proposals for direct price intervention using the basis of emergency price controls enacted
during the war that included price floors designed to encourage crop production patterns
consistent with US and allies war efforts (Kennedy 2004). The first non-wartime direct

9
commodity market intervention was implemented under the Agricultural Marketing Act
(AMA) of 1929. The AMA established the Federal Farm Board to manage support for
wheat prices via the Grain Stabilization Corporation through a purchasing program that
procured grain at support price levels and sold excess stocks overseas or stored until
market prices rose in response to domestic shortage.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of May 1933 followed as the next
attempt at farm price supports, passed as one of the bills implemented as part of

 

            

effort was the emphasis on managing commodity prices through supply side incentives
(Gardner 2009). This marked the beginning of supply management, a method to increase
farm revenues by limiting overproduction and resultant price declines. The AAA also
created the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a government enterprise providing
non-recourse loans to farmers with crop serving as the sole collateral. Loan programs (in
various forms) have been a consistent feature of US price support establishing minimum
prices for crops set legislatively.
These loans were made on a per bushel basis at a specified loan rate at harvest
giving the farmer the option to market the collateralized harvest if prices rose high
enough above the loan rate to cover transaction and interest expenses. Being a nonrecourse loan, the CCC would take the collateral at no penalty to the farmer if prices were
not high enough, and the crop would be held by the government for price stabilization or
other public policy efforts. Loan programs beginning with the FAIR Act of 1996 were
changed dramatically, ending the option to deliver harvest to government stocks
programs due to the high cost and uncertain procurement entailed (Schertz 1999).

10
Supply management apart from the role government stocks played in loan
programs has its own complicated history in US commodity policy. As Hertel
summarized, the economics of agricultural production dictate that supply control as a
policy conceit is at best a short run countercyclical measure and is self-defeating in the
long run (Hertel 1990). These economic factors simply stated are: income and price
inelastic demand for agricultural outputs, and the retention of productive resources in
agriculture leading to excess capacity. Efforts to arrive at a workable supply control
program persisted over the sixty-year period from 1930 to 1990 despite the economic
precepts o  

           

    -Owned Reserve programs to encourage farmers to expand
storage of grain for marketing after the low-price post-harvest period.
Acreage-idling programs served as the second mechanism for supply control,
either mandating that farmers to set aside arable land to qualify for price supports or
paying rental fees for dedicated set asides to meet conservation goals. The AAA served
as the initial experiment with managing supply through set-aside land. Land idling and
land retirement programs were featured throughout the twentieth century, most recently
in the long-standing Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) which provides rental
contracts to farmers that set aside land which is sensitive to erosion or provides other
environmental services. While the CRP has an explicit goal of setting aside land for nonmarket benefits, i.e. to secure environmental benefits, its initiation coincided with a
number of supply control efforts including the Payment In Kind (PIK) program that paid
producers in stored government crop for idled arable land. (Hertel 1990, Richardson
1999)

11
The PIK program ended up being a costly experiment with double the expected
signup and a regional distribution of grain stocks that severely increased management
costs. Abandonment of PIK left the Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) as the only
remaining supply explicit supply control measure. The passage of the 1996 farm bill
ended the ARP, closing the book on land retirement as supply management in US farm
policy (Doig, 1983). The increasing reliance on agricultural trade and considerable
administrative cost and misallocation repeatedly brought supply control motivated setasides under critical fire. The program is most notable for its errant policy directives that
deterred US farmer response to market signals, such as the 1972 call to increase set-aside
wheat acreage even as export demand began a sharp increase. This shortage would be
 

     

         

20 million acres were idled creating an induced shortage that ran up prices and provided
the strong market environment for passage of the 1996 farm bill. Outside of these
dramatic examples the ARP program repeatedly failed to meet supply reduction targets
 

     

  



        

 

minimize the actual output reduction (Ericksen and Collins, 1983).
The reformed commodity policies of the FAIR Act of 1996 (Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act) provided the initial foray into decoupled direct payments
and the end of acreage reduction programs in the US. The legacy of ARP is evident in
figure 2.1 showing the slow reduction in mandated set-asides in response to the mid1980s farm crisis. The limits these placed on supply potential nearly doomed the
experiment with decoupled support as large market losses required repeated emergency
subsidy funds in the beginning years (1997-2000) of the  !     "

12
program of payments that were de-linked from production and prices. Figure 2.1
illustrates the amount of acres idled through programs in the twentieth century.

Figure 2. 1 History of Acreage Idled in US P    
American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century)


Figure 2. 2 Value of Government I     
Agriculture in the Twentieth Century)







  

 

 

Government use of non-recourse loan programs fostered dissatisfaction with the
storage of excess grain only to subsequently dump it onto the market when market prices

14
In overview, the Federal Government has exerted considerable influence over
agricultural markets via commodity program since the Great Depression. Federal
payment expenditures have been a major topic of debate in program implementation with
farm bill spending on commodity support being constrained to spend no more than its
current baseline projection with each farm bill reauthorization. Figure 2.3 illustrates total
government program expenditures throughout the twentieth century. Payments average
some 10 billion between 1965 and 1990 in 1992 dollars though they largely track market
performance, exceeding that average in the years between the periods of 1965 to 1972
and 1983 to 1990 when agricultural market slumped. The payment levels peaked in 1987
with an expenditure of over 20 billion. Both the high level of spending and the role
 



               

 

                   
                    !

2.2: Post-1996 U.S. Commodity Programs
The post-1996 period is marked by a consistent approach to commodity policy,
with direct payments made on the basis of historical acreage serving as the common
means through all iterations o           "#$ %ERS-USDA
2016). The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR), the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of
2008, and the Agricultural Act of 2014 have all been passed with either direct payments
as a prominent feature of support or (in the case of 2014) reforming the constant payout
of direct payments as an explicit goal.

15
The 1996 farm act implemented multiple commodity programs that would be in
effect from 1996 to 2002. Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC) and non-recourse loans
served as the primary commodity programs that were expected to transition US crop
agriculture away from federally funded income and price support (Richardson 1999). The
PFC program was a landmark change in agricultural support, implementing a set of
prescribed payments from 1996 to 2002 while using historical yields and planting as the
basis for subsidy receipts irrespective of current farm decisions and market performance.
These contracts required producers to comply with all conservation provisions and
planting flexibility provisions to maintain eligibility, but otherwise offered limited
influence over producer decision-making (ERS-USDA 2016).
The PFC program required each producer to establish a base acreage level for
each eligible crop on their operation, a feature still used in commodity payments and that
 

 

        

    

recent history of production. The PFC program of the FAIR act established the role of
payment yields, a fixed level of production tied to each base acre that is used to form the
historical production level for support. Finally, PFC payments were made by commodity
on 85 percent of base acreage, a factor the government can use to control spending levels
though it has remained at 85 percent of base acres for most program implementations
subsequent to 1996. PFC contracts introduced payment limits on an individual basis,
establishing a limit of $40,000 per person and $80,000 under the three-entity rule (ERSUSDA 2016).

16
PFC payments represented the bulk of expected farm commodity support under
the 1996 farm bill though nonrecourse loans were continued under the FAIR Act. The
loan program allows farmers to obtain loans at a specified per-bushel rate by using the
crop as collateral with the loan rates for corn, soybeans, and wheat set to 85 percent of
the olympic 5-year moving average of prices. In this regard the loan rates of the 1996
farm bill resemble the benchmarking process of newly formed programs in 2014, which
look to the preceding five-year history of yields and prices for establishing payment
thresholds for commodity producers.
The 2002 farm bill initiated the first program lab     

  

were nearly identical in structure (base acres and yield assignment) and independence
from market factors to the PFC payments of the 1996 FAIR Act. Direct payments are
made on fixed per-bushel rates of $0.52/bu for wheat, $0.28/bu for corn, and $0.44/bu for
soybeans, values that continued through the life of the direct payments program from
2002 to 2014. The payment quantity is derived from multiplying 85 percent of the


  

    

  

  for that farm. Additional to

direct payments and the continuation of the loan program, the 2002 farm bill introduced
counter-cyclical payments (CCP).
This unique addition to the 2002 Farm Bill was introduced to formalize the
emergency response spending that were required to increase agricultural income support
for many places in the country when farm prices dropped precipitously in 1997 and 1998.
The counter-cyclical payments were designed to trigger when effective prices (national
average prices plus the direct payment rate per bushel) fall below a target level

17
established in the legislation (Gray 2002). Target prices of $3.92/bu, $2.63/bu, and
$5.80/bu for wheat, corn, and soybeans respectively set the CCP program triggers for

    

 span. These CCP payments (like direct payments) were

made based on historical yield factors and base acreage but are triggered by current
market performance. This dual reliance on current and historical information makes for a
program that has limited influence on current decision making because farmers cannot
influence the size of the payment received through any on-farm decision.
Non-

     

            

nature they have come to play in assisting farmers with loan benefits that effectively set a
floor under prices and provide some flexibility in timing of sales. The loan rates for
wheat, corn, and soybeans are significantly lower than the CCP target prices at $2.75/bu,
$1.95/bu, and $5.00/bu respectively (Gray 2002). This tiered support is by design with

             

       



conditions. Marketing loans are directly tied to current prices and planting so that they
provide the ultimate floor under the actual crop produced.

           !        
direct payments, counter-cyclical payments and a new optional program, the average crop
revenue election program (ACRE), in addition to continued marketing assistance loans.
The direct payments were little changed in program design, continuing payments on 85
percent2 of the base acres and at rates of soybeans are $0.52/bu (wheat), $0.28/bu (corn),

2

Direct payments were paid on only 83.3 percent of base acres during 2009 and 2011 in an effort to bring
the farm bill in under its baseline spending limit for the five year life of the program.

18
$0.44/bu (soybeans) respectively. Farmers were offered the choice to forego twenty
percent of their direct payment rate in exchange for an enrollment in the average crop
revenue election (ACRE) program (Johnson 2008).
The counter-cyclical payments continued in 2008 with $3.92/bu, $2.63/bu,
$5.80/bu payment rates for wheat, corn, and soybeans respectively. Over the course of
the five years of the 2008 farm bill these target prices adjust to $4.17/bu, $2.63/bu,
$6.00/bu respectively (Johnson 2008). Producers who elect to enter the ACRE program
alternative forego their CCP coverage in addition to the twenty percent reduction in their
direct payments. This established the ACRE program as a revenue alternative to countercyclical price support and set the stage for the menu of programs that eventually emerge
in 2014 in the subsequent farm bill.
The average crop revenue election (ACRE) program was introduced as part of the
process of making crop subsidy support behave more like crop insurance with payouts
inversely related to income performance measures. In that sense, the 20 percent reduction
in direct payments and an additional 30 percent reduction in marketing assistance loans
could be thought of as the premium payments for the ACRE insurance subsidy. ACRE
payouts occur when a complex two-trigger set of criteria is met. Enrollees receive a per
acre payment if the state average revenue (on a per acre basis) falls below 90 percent of
the state benchmark calculated from a 5-year benchmark state yield and a 2-year national
price average.
The 5-year benchmark y 

  

    



     

with the lowest and highest state average yields by crop omitted from the 5 year average
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calculation. The national price average is the average over the most recent two years with
the loan rate guarantee price replacing the national price in years when market price is
too low. To receive payments individual farms must show a loss against their individual
benchmark revenue (calculated the same as for the state) and be in a state that has a
minimum 10% shortfall of average revenue.
Actual payments to farms are modulated by a farm specific productivity ratio that
   

   



-year olympic average yield divided by the state benchmark

yield. The per acre payment rate is equal the lesser of the difference between the 90
percent benchmark for the state and 25 percent of the state benchmark for a given
commodity. ACRE introduced farm operators to revenue based subsidies bringing both
yield and price factors to bear in determination of payment levels for farmers.

2.3: The Agricultural Act of 2014
The most recent farm bill is the Agricultural Act of 2014 (AA14). This farm bill
was passed amid some of the most volatile budget debates in modern US history with the
nutrition title and its assistance to low income families a primary target of budget hawks.
The much smaller spending on the commodity title has lower potential budget impact but
was made to fall in line showing significant contributions to deficit reduction when
compared against baseline forecasts for spending.
Despite the discord in farm bill negotiations, there was universal support for
ending direct payments. Once the dominant rhetoric around direct payments became


 

    

  

   

 

  

    

20
vocal defenders of the program that had fostered an agricultural sector that was able to
respond to market forces and thrive during the Great Recession. The 2014 farm bill
featured across the board reform with every program eliminated and in some instances
replaced by close or distant cousins in terms of design.
As a replacement for the CCP program the 2014 farm bill adds price loss
coverage (PLC) as its counter-cyclical price support initiative. The ACRE program with
its complex dual-trigger payment calculation is replaced by the simplified Agricultural
Risk Coverage (ARC) county option (ARC-CO) which localizes the revenue protection
aspects of ACRE to the county level and eliminates on farm factors for determining
payments. Farms that desire on farm determination of payments must opt into the second
option of the ARC program, named the individual coverage (ARC-IC), a program that
comes at significant penalty relative to ARC-CO as farmers only receive payments on
65% of base acres instead of the traditional 85%.
The new mix of programs is clearly envisioned as more of a safety net for
producers with a localization of support that depends on the county where production is
located. Producers were required to evaluate all potential options of the farm bill and
elect their base acres into one of the program options for the duration of the farm bill.
The price loss coverage (PLC) program operates similar to the counter cyclical
payment program in that it relies on a change in price to implement payments. Payments
are triggered within the policy whenever the market price falls below the respected




 

             

duration of the farm bill are $5.50/bu, $3.70/bu, and $8.40/bu respectively, a marked
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increase from past CCP support reflecting the market conditions transpiring since 2008
farm bill passage.
The ARC-C and ARC-I programs differ from the PLC program functionally by
the role yield plays in determining payments. The producer may choose to enroll in the
county level or the individual level, but the individual option requires the farm to have
complete farm data for yield and revenues. There are also some differences in payment
calculation as well. The county option payments can be implemented when the actual
county per acre revenue drops below 86 percent of the benchmark per acre revenue,
which is the product of the 5-year olympic averages of higher of loan rates or national
price and county yield. The payment rate is calculated by taking the lower of the
difference between the benchmark per acre revenue and the actual per acre revenue or 10
percent of the benchmark per acre revenue. The full commodity payment is then
calculated by multiplying the payment rate by 85 percent of

  



  

The total payment then is the sum of all crop payments (Shields, 2014).
However, the individual option payments are triggered when the sum of the per
acre revenue across all covered crops fall below the guaranteed per acre revenue. The
guaranteed per acre revenue is calculated by taking 86 percent the benchmark revenue
summed up across all crops. The benchmark per acre revenue is calculated by
multiplying the 5-year olympic national price average by the 5-year olympic average
farm yield for each commodity. The payment rate is then calculated by taking the lesser
between the difference of the individual farm guarantee per acre revenue and the actual
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per acre farm payment is calculated by multiplying the payment rate by 65 percent of the
base acres for the farm (Shields, 2014). Even though payment calculation is slightly
different between the two options, the two programs share many similarities to how they
are triggered in the market.
Overall, the commodity program mix changed only gradually from 1996 to 2008
reflecting considered stability. The advent of the 2008 ACRE program as an optional
alternative heralded the mindset to shift support to larger payouts when markets are weak
and limiting payments when market and income performance are strong. The 2008
ACRE program found limited favor with those offered the option due to forecast market
 

 

    

  



    

averages which often bear little relation to local production and revenue conditions.
The considered stability for the 18 years prior to 2014 was turned completely on
its head with the elimination of direct payments, a constant addition to farm income that
many producers had adopted as a certain component in financial and cash flow
management. The new payment regime meant that market performance was guaranteed
to determine when payments are made with considerable uncertainty about the final level
those payments reach. Thus, 2014 began a period where the addition to farm income from
commodity programs has no certain component to assist farmers in management and
provides no reliable means for forecasting budget outlays for lawmakers and legislative
staff tasked with monitoring and evaluation of the farm bill.
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2.4: Recent Role of Government Farm Payments

Government payments have played a large role in supporting farm income
through direct payments and safety net programs. In the five years prior to the 2014 Farm
Bill, farmers have received direct payments, ACRE payments, counter-cyclical payments,
and others. Just how these payments have influenced farm income is a topic of continued
interest to farm policy analysts.
Government spending in terms of U.S. agriculture has fluctuated around 10
billion current dollars in the recent period between 2009 and 2014. Expenditure levels
were 12.1 billion in 2009, 12.4 billion in 2010, 10.4 billion in 2011, 10.6 billion in 2012,
11 billion in 2013, and 9.7 billion in 2014 (USDA-ERS). The largest portion of these
payments came from direct commodity payments, which averaged around 4.7 billion up
until they were largely eliminated in 2014. The second largest spending factor came from
conservation programs that averaged 3.5 billion dollars between 2009 and 2014. ACRE
payments were not seen until 2010 and averaged only 187.8 million in spending until
2014, reflecting the limited appeal of the program in its 2008 incarnation. Countercyclical payments and loan deficiency payments averaged 287.6 million in spending in
2009 to 2014 as a result of relatively low support prices compared to the market strength
of agricultural prices across the board.
Direct payments had the largest share of farm program spending, with the base
acreage commitments identifying which crops these payments nominally support3. The

3

Note that payments to base acres are not dependent on what is currently planted. Base acres are
effectively frozen to some historical planting allocation so that a farm can grow continuous corn in year X
yet have its payments made over a base acreage allocation that is split among numerous crops.
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crops that received the largest portions of the direct payments can be approximately
calculated using the income support rates per bushel, payment yields, and enrolled acres.
Corn, wheat, and soybeans rank as the top crops respectively among all of the
commodities receiving payments. Corn would receive an estimated 2.4 billion of the
payments, which is around half of the yearly average. Wheat would receive 1.3 billion in
payments, and soybeans would receive .68 billion of direct payment expenditures. The
payments used on corn, wheat, and soybeans takes up the vast majority of direct payment
spending.
The main objective of the commodity programs is to support farm income.
Therefore, another interesting question is how important are these programs in supporting
farm income in recent years. We can find the percentage of income that is from support
payments by dividing the amount of government payments by the net farm income. In the
years 2009 to 2014, government support payments have averaged 12.6 percent. The
highest rate occurred in 2009 and 2010 with 19.6 and 16.1 percent respectively. These
years also had the lowest farm income as well, which leads one to believe that farm
income support programs become much more important in low income years. However,
the 10 percent average in 2011 to 2014 is still rather important to income considering a
farm with 100,000 dollars in annual income would roughly receive 10,000 dollars form
the government. The government payments themselves would give farmers enough
excess income to cover some input costs or invest in additional opportunities.
The recent 2014 Farm Bill marks the transition of American agriculture policy
from direct farm support payments to counter-cyclical safety net programs. Since the
1996 FAIR Act, the majority of farm payments have not been tied to the economic
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prosperity of the farmer and could be responsible for unnecessary support that could
disrupt the natural market. For example, corn and sorghum producers received higher
fixed support rate in comparison to target price than any other crop. From 1996-2014,
corn and sorghum producers' ratio of direct payment rates to counter-cyclical trigger
prices were .11 and .13 respectively while soybeans were just .07.
However, counter-cyclical programs like Agricultural Risk Coverage and PriceLoss Coverage would only provide support in down years depending on where the
support prices are established. This means that there is no component of farm income that
is certain and all government payment receipts will now only be resolved one full year
after harvest when the national average marketing year price is determined. But this is not
the only timing issue involved, the pattern of payments and the initialization of the 2014
 

     



  

  



role and will be a focus of the analysis in chapter 3. To better understand the motivation
behind the choice to set these program options for farmers and to frame subsequent
analysis the next section provides some background on the 2014 farm bill debate, a
contentious two-year process that stands unprecedented for the difficulty of passage as
well as providing signals about the future of farm bill legislation when the 2014 law
expires.

2.5: 2014 Farm Bill Background
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 expired on September 30, 2012.
When the bill expired the current programs under the bill technically lost their authority
to distribute payments to agricultural producers. However, negotiations over a new farm
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bill were going slowly, and the 2008 Farm Bill was extended twice. It was extended till
the end of 2012 and then again until the end of the 2013 crop year (Monke 2013).
Negotiations about a new farm bill continued well into the fall of 2013, and if the 2008
programs were not extended or a new farm bill was created the permanent laws of 1949
hovered as a looming threat that would authorize payments out of sync with any current
view of markets and require specific de-authorizing legislation to eliminate the exorbitant
payouts that would be scheduled under 1949 parameters. The failure to extend or create a
new farm bill would increase spending dramatically because many of the permanent laws
had high support prices or were of an older design that cost more (Monke 2013).
Programs that were extended were mostly with mandatory funding. Programs like
the Marketing Assistance loans, Counter-Cyclical Payments, and even the 5 billion dollar
a year direct payment program was extended until the end of the 2013 crop year (Monke
2013). Eventually, the 2008 Farm Bill had to be extended again on January 1, 2014 to
keep the permanent laws out effect. Finally, the Agricultural Act of 2014 passed in
February of 2014. Much of the hesitation to implement a new farm bill spurred from the
debate over the amount of spending that should be in the farm bill.
The commodity programs within the Agricultural Act of 2014 were not entirely
original in their design to distribute support farmers. The new programs in question,
Agriculture Risk Coverage and Price Loss Coverage, are very similar to the Average
Crop Revenue Election and Counter-Cyclical Programs respectively. ACRE would be
viewed as a precursor to ARC in how they both distribute payments when the total
revenue level falls below a set benchmark. Even though the two programs are similar,
there were many adjustments made in the 2014 Farm Bill.
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     -wide average benchmark revenue was narrowed down to a
county-wide historic olympic average. Other major changes include lowering the
payment cap from 25 percent to 10 percent, minor calculation differences, and the
addition of an individual option for ARC. Likewise, the CCP could be seen as a precursor
to PLC in how they both depend only on price to trigger payments and have extremely
similar calculations to determine payments. However, CCP was dependent on the direct
payment program rate in determining the CCP payment rate. Since direct payments were
discontinued, PLC was created.
The most influential change to the mix of commodity programs within the
Agricultural Act of 2014 is the repeal of direct payments to producers. Since the 1996
FAIR Act, eligible crop farmers would receive a direct fixed payment every year
determined by their base acreage for that period. The direct payments were not tied to any
market factor like revenue or price, but were viewed as a direct way to support farm
income. As stated previously, direct payments were the main source of spending in terms
of commodity program spending. Therefore, direct payments were removed from the
program mix in effort to reduce spending and make the program mix more of a safety net
with assistance limited to low income years.
Similar to the motive of repealing direct payments, conservation programs were
bundled together or repealed in an effort to reduce spending. Major programs like the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Environmental Quality Incentives Program
(EQIP), and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) were reauthorized. The largest
conservation program, CRP, was reduced from 32 million acres to 24 million acres and
was amended to include a wider variety of acreages that were under terminated programs
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to reduce spending (Shields 2014). EQIP was combined with other wildlife programs and
took a 5 percent cut in funding, and CSP was reduced in acreage from 12.8 million to 10
million acres (Shields 2014). Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP) and
Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) were created to bundle the other
numerous environmental policies that were under effect. The streamlining of the
conservation title represented a significant yet undervalued effort taken in the 2014 farm
  

 

      

 the debate that

eventually saw conservation compliance regulations attached to participation in
subsidized crop insurance programs (Shields 2014).
Nutrition provisions spending within the 2014 Farm Bill were one of the largest
stumbling blocks for the a     

 

  

House of Representatives membership favored a stripped down nutritional program that
cut spending by 39 billion dollars over 10 years. Contrarily, the senate passed its version
of a farm bill with a nutrition title that only contributed 4 billion to deficit reduction over
the 10 year baseline markup of the bill. The wide gap in the two opinions within congress
caused a long stalemate that led to the 2014 Farm Bill not passing until February 2014.
Eventually, congress agreed to cut spending by 8 billion over the course of ten years
(Shields, 2014).
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) was the source of most
of the budget cuts within the nutrition portion of the bill. Most of the cuts would be
implemented in changes to SNAP eligibility and the calculation of benefits, which
tightened down on more able-bodied adults. The Emergency Food Assistance Program
(TEFAP) that distributes food aid to areas in crisis was amended to increase spending by
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205 million over the course of ten years. Other portions of the nutrition section of the
farm bill such as school lunches and the Commodity Supplemental Food Program faced
some small amendments, but stayed relatively consistent.

2.6: ARC and PLC Sign Up
In chapter 3, the analysis will rely on to specific calculations derived from the
ARC and PLC program parameters. Thus we review the implementation process that has
occurred in the 2014 commodity programs. Enrollment was opened on October 6, 2014
to allow farmers a one-time opportunity to update base acreage and program yield for the
duration of the bill. Farmers were then allowed to choose which programs they were
going to participate in beginning in November 17, 2014. Eligible crops (covered
commodities) for ARC include corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, barley, sorghum, rice,
sunflower, rapeseed, canola, safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed, crambe, sesame seed, dry
peas, chickpeas, and peanuts. Corn, soybean, and wheat are the main covered
commodities in

 









 



subject of our review and

analysis.

A definite bias towards the ARC-CO program can be seen within the results of
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on the following page,

reveals the data for program sign up for Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio. For Indiana, the
ARC-CO option accounted for an average of 96.6 percent of farms and 96 percent of base
acres across corn, soybeans, and wheat. Meanwhile, PLC accounts for the majority of the
remainder with an average of 3.3 percent of farms and 4 percent of base acres. The ARC-
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IC option only accounted for less than half a percent of both farms and base acres (FSA).
The heavy favoritism towards ARC-CO in Indiana suggests that produces prefer the
shallow loss coverage of the Agriculture Risk Coverage program at least as it performs
given the initial conditions that existed for the 2014 crop year 4.

The program election data from Indiana is very similar to the neighboring states
of Illinois and Ohio with the exception of wheat, which had a larger share under PLC.
23.4 percent of farms and 35.2 percent of acreage in Illinois and 14.4 percent and 17.5
percent in Ohio went under the PLC program. The election for the ARC-IC option still
remains extremely low for the two states. One could assume that the region featuring
Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio faces moderately homogenous circumstances that would prefer
the shallow loss protection of ARC-CO. However, why there was little interest in the
individual option of ARC across the states. A probable reason is that the individual
option only pays 65 percent of enrolled base acres and requires a more extensive record
from the individual farm to be eligible.

4

The 2014 farm program election offered the unique situation where farmers could select the program that
covered a crop that was already harvested since 2014 payments were applied retroactively given the signup
choice in 2015.
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Table 2. 1 Indiana and Neighbor    
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2.7: ARC and PLC Program Descriptions
The Price Loss Coverage program is the successor of the Counter-Cyclical
Program that began in 2002. Like the Counter-Cyclical Payments the driving factor
behind initiating payments is the price. Once the price of a specific commodity falls
below the target price, enrolled farms will receive the smallest difference between the
target price and the actual price or the lone rate on 85 percent of the enrolled acres for
that commodity. The main objective of the program is to protect against deeper losses
that could occur in times of variable prices.
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The Agriculture Risk Coverage program is a farm revenue protection program
that is the successor to the Average Crop Revenue Election program that began in the
2008 Farm Bill. Unlike PLC, the ARC program uses revenue to initiate payments. The
program is designed to cover shallow revenue losses as it has a 10 percent of benchmark
revenue maximum payment rate.
The ARC program gives the farmer two options when considering the ARC
program, a county option or an individual option. The ARC-CO option distributes
payments based on a county-wide 5-year olympic average to set the benchmark revenue.

 

               

the average or benchmark revenue for that commodity (FSA).
The ARC-IC option differs by narrowing down the county average to a single
proprietor average. This means that the farmer must have complete data submitted to the
farmer to be eligible. Other major differences would be that payments are only made to

         age and that the farmer would not be eligible to
enroll in the government supported Supplemental Crop Insurance (SCO) (FSA). A side
by side analysis over the differences of the programs are presented in table 2.2.
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Table 2. 2 Comparison of 2014 Commodity Program Features (Source: Farm Service
Agency)

2.8: ARC and PLC Payment Equations
The payments that a producer receives from the Price Loss Coverage program
is dependent on the change of prices that occurs for a covered commodity. Therefore, a
change in yield would have no effect upon the payment that a farm would receive.
However, the policy provides deep loss coverage that is only limited by controls on the
total government receipts to an individual operator.
PLC payments are triggered once the national market year price falls below a
commodity specific reference price. Once the payment is triggered, the payment is
formulated by taking the difference in the benchmark price and the actual price and
multiplying by the farm specific program yield. The program yield is updated by the

 

               

those farms that elected to update yields). The product of the difference in prices and the
program yield is then multiplied by a factor of .85 to discover the per acre payment.
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Table 2. 3 PLC Reference Prices in the 2014 Farm Bill for Select Crops (Source: FSA)

For example, if the price of corn fell to $3.50 per bushel, and the farms program
yield was 165; the per acre payment formula would be (3.70

3.50) * 165 * .85 and

would equal 28.05 per commodity base acre.
The Agricultural Risk Coverage program is designed to be a total revenue safety
net. Therefore,          s the ARC payments. However,
because all farms with base acreage in the same commodity identify the same national
price factor, yield is the determinant for differing payment rates across counties. Farms
within a county will differ only by their base acreage in the covered commodity. The
ARC program is divided into an individual basis program and a county basis program.
Main differences between the two programs is that the farm must have enough data to
               

      

steeper payment discount rate. The county discount rate is .85 and the individual rate
is .65.
In the ARC-CO program, a payment is triggered if the actual revenue is less than
the ARC revenue guarantee. The guarantee is 86 percent of the county benchmark
revenue. The benchmark revenue is calculated by taking the 5 year olympic average of
the yields and market year average prices. However, the payment rate must not exceed
10 percent of the revenue guarantee rate. The payment formulas for ARC-C and ARC-I
are as follows:
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The programs are designed to support income in a vastly different way than the
previous direct payment program that is responsible for the largest portion of income
support in the previous farm bill. The programs are designed to be a safety net that is only
used in downturn years instead of paying a fixed amount regardless of economic
conditions. This method of income support is designed to reduce the amount of
government spending on farm programs and reduce the amount of market influence the
payments have. An example would be how under direct payments, corn received a larger
payment rate per bushel than any other crop in reference to its market price.
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

3.1 Model Scenario
The scenario for the model used to calculate program payments for 2014 to 2018
is a single deterministic baseline projection. The motivation for using a single scenario is
because of the data available and the analytical frame needed to accomplish the
objectives. The model has the necessary data to calculate the payments for 2014 and the
2015 benchmarks exactly, since the 2014 crop year has been completed. Aside from 2014
and 2015, 2016 to 2018 are the only years of completely unknown information. For those
years, the model assumes that the USDA price projections would hold true since other
studies reveal a similar outlook. Outside of the information aspect of the decision, the one
scenario model allows the analysis of the two known market shocks. The shocks are the
current price decline and the large yield increase seen in 2014. The variance across
counties in the model also provides a robust frame to evaluate the behavior of the 2014
programs versus the control. The stable baseline scenario also allows for the inclusion
    

 



 

  

 

 

 

agnostic view of the future.
The model itself is a projection for 2014 to 2018 of program payments for all
three programs using their own payment calculations in a GAMS program. The model
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predicts the payments for corn, soybeans, and wheat producers in all 92 counties in
Indiana. The counties are then broken down into 9 geographical regions using acreage
weights. The only data needed for input in the model are the prices and yields. For prices,
the USDA long-run forecast is used as it is unbiased and still allows for a sufficient
analysis of program behavior. A variable rate of increase is used for yields which has a
constant increase of 1.33 percent then add a variable rate that is the state yield divided by
that counties yield. The variable rate includes the room of growth that lower yielding
counties perceive. The average yield growth rate used in the model is 2.25 percent.

 



     

   base acre minus

the 85 percent base acre adjustment factor. The factor is left out because of the
assumption that it would not be included until payment rates were calculated. The ARCCO per base acre payment rate calculation is straight forward because the actual payment
is per base acre, but PLC and DP are on a per bushel basis. In order to transform the PLC
and DP rates into a per acre basis, the model must incorporate the fixed yield factors that
persist throughout the life of the program. The model uses 86 percent of each counties
average yield from 2009 to 2013 to be the representative PLC program yield. The 86
percent is used instead of 90 because the FSA updated the average to be the 2008 to 2012
average, and many farm averages include the use of a much lower plug yield for years
that did not report a specific crop yield. Therefore, the added 4 percent discount helps
include the lower plug yields and the one-year discount. The resulting PLC yield is then
used for DP as well under the assumption of that is how DP would behave if it was to be
continued as a program.
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Section 3.2: Introduction to Results
The GAMS model organizes the results in a unique way that allows the analysis
of the 2014 commodity programs to be conducted across multiple dimensions that are
useful to current policy debates. The levels of the dimensions of the analysis are in the
order of crops, program, geography, price, and time respectively.
The first of the output dimensions are the specified crops, corn, soybeans, and
wheat, which make up the majority of Indiana crop acreage. Then the model computes
the payments for these crops by dollars per base acre for ARC, PLC, and Direct
Payments, which all interact differently with the succeeding dimensions.
After the first two simple dimensions, the analysis delves into how the payments
differ across geographical regions, which are represented by the 92 Indiana counties and
the 9 agricultural districts. The agricultural districts are consistent with the USDA
definitions. The geographical dimension has an interesting effect on how payments are
dispersed across the state. For ARC, the diversity of payment levels across counties are
extremely dependent on the historical and actual yields of each region because they all
perceive a consistent price protection. For example, a county with historically low yields
does not have to face the same actual increase in yields as higher yielding counties to
achieve the same percentage yield increase needed to opt out of payments as a higher
yielding county. In 2014, each county had to face a 29 percent increase in yields to not
receive payments. A county that has an ARC benchmark of 200 bushels per acre has to
increase by 58 bushels per acre to not receive payment; however, a 140 bushels per acre
benchmark county only has to have a 40.6 increase. This is an example of a potential
discrepancy of ARC payments. Unlike ARC, PLC and the control DP are not subject to
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changing yields but is held constant by the fixed program yield. The program yield still
varies by county, but are held constant throughout the life of the program as a means to
calculate per acre payment. The geographical dimension also shows a relationship
between the programs in how differing yields among counties could potentially affect the
preference of ARC versus PLC and DP.
Market and program prices are the next dimension of the model output. For each
program, prices have a different interaction with payment levels. For ARC, prices have a
dual interaction in how they change the benchmark though out time. The changing
benchmark could potentially force payment levels in a given direction. For example,
payment levels could continually fall if the benchmark price is driven down by
consistently low prices, which when income support is needed most. Unlike ARC, PLC
has a constant reference price. Therefore, potential payment levels do not change with the
program. The only variable factor on payment levels is the actual price. Finally, DP is not
tied to prices and has constant payment levels throughout time. Interestingly, the price
dimension also illustrates a relationship in the support level and preference between the
programs as well. For example, figure 3.1 illustrates the price support relationship
between ARC and PLC.
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Figure 3. 1 ARC/PLC Payments Outcomes given a 4 Percent Yield Increase (source:
Keeney)
The dashed lines show the 2014 payment levels for ARC and PLC assuming there is a 4
percent increase in yield. With the yield assumption, ARC begins to issue payments for
corn at 4.54 dollars per bushel, and PLC issues payments at the reference price of 3.70
dollars per bushel. The figure reveals that ARC is the preferred program until the price
falls to 3.17 dollars per bushel.
The last dimension of the results is how the programs interact throughout time.
ARC has a complex relationship with time because of the moving benchmarks for price
and yield. The way each of these behave annually can force the benchmark up or down
and have a direct impact on the level of support. Price affects the benchmark consistently
across regions but a constant decrease in prices could cause the benchmark revenue to
decrease as well as the payment limit. Yield could also have the exact same affect, but
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could vary greatly across counties and throughout time. However, the threshold for PLC
is consistent throughout the life of the program and payment levels throughout time are
entirely reliant on actual national prices. Unlike the 2014 programs, Direct Payments do
not change throughout time.

3.3: ARC outcomes for all crops in Indiana in 2014
The outcomes for ARC are interesting for the role regional/local productivity and
changes in that productivity play on a year to year basis. Price protection in the ARC
program is initially strong with benchmark prices (the five year olympic average national
price) for all crops well above expected market prices which are themselves somewhat
higher than PLC support levels in general. An important note is that the results are the
true ARC outcomes for 2014 based on actual data collected by FSA and calculated to
generate county averages. Table 3.1 shows the ARC payments by crop for all the nine
crop reporting districts of Indiana for 2014. The crop reporting districts are identical to
those specified by the United State Department of Agriculture.
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Table 3. 1 ARC 2014 Payment Outcomes for all C

  



 





The fact that soybeans and wheat acres receive practically zero payments with the
exception of the mid-eastern section for soybeans for 2014 represents an interesting
contrast with the results for corn. The calculation would be a direct result of a statewide
high yield for those two crops with marginally smaller price protection under the ARC
program. The 2014 national price used for calculation of soybean ARC payments is
$10.10 and the ARC benchmark price is $12.27. Likewise, the national price for wheat
was $5.99 and the ARC benchmark is $6.60. Those current prices represent 21 percent
and 10 percent deficits relative to benchmark prices used in the ARC revenue calculation.
ARC payments are triggered when revenue falls by 14 percent so if yield is unchanged
from benchmark levels soybean payments should receive payments and wheat should not
be based on the price component of the program5. These differentials in the two prices for

5

The linear approximation to the price and yield percentage change components impact on revenue is
formally states as r = p + y where the lower case variables are percentage change in revenue (r), price (p),
and quantity (q). As described in the text, this linear approximation would set -14 percent revenue change (r
= -14) as the target requiring p + q to sum to -14. The linear approximation is imprecise for such a large
LHS factor of -14 percent and should only be used as a general decomposition guideline as is used here
providing context for evaluating yield components across counties.
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each commodity means that yields must have only minor increases for soybeans or must
have a minor decrease in the case of wheat to expect ARC payments to occur.
The fact that revenue is the product of price and quantity can be used as a simple
estimation to determine how much the yield must increase to force no payments. The
revenue must fall by 14 percent in order to distribute payments. Therefore, the average
rate of price and yield difference must be less than -14 percent for payments to occur.
The resulting yield percentage difference from the benchmark for soybeans and wheat
should be approximately 7 percent and -4 percent for soybeans and wheat to generate
ARC payments for base acres in those crops. In fact, the 2014 state average of both the
yields for soybeans and wheat were +18.5 percent and +15 percent relative to the
benchmark respectively 2014(FSA). Therefore, this simple approximation serves to
explain the lack of ARC payments for both commodities. The effect that yield has on the
statewide ARC payment levels is significant for soybeans and wheat. The average yield
increase experienced by the two crops was high enough for them not to receive ARC
payments for the majority of Indiana.

    

              

geographic regions were the recipients of 2014 ARC payments. Like soybeans and wheat,
the 2014 national price was well below the ARC benchmark set by the FSA. In this case,
the difference is much more severe with a percentage deficit of 43 percent relative to the
benchmark price. This differential suggests that if yield performance is similar to those
previously discussed for soybeans and wheat then we should expect to find significant
ARC payments and in some cases ARC payments that meet the limiting payout. The
percent revenue drop must be 14 percent to initiate payments and must be -24 percent to
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limit payments. The percent difference in 2014 average state yields and the FSA
benchmark is 21 percent (FSA). This yield difference is larger than what is seen in both
soybeans and wheat, but it is not generally large enough to overcome the 43 percent price
difference making Indiana base acres for corn eligible for ARC payments.
The general scenario of all three prices being below the benchmark but most
regions across all crops not receiving payments reveals the effect that yield has on the
ARC payment calculation. However, the differences in the scenarios for soybeans and
wheat in comparison to corn are a prime example of how the national price factor and
local (county) yield factor determine ARC payments without respect to individual farm
revenue performance. Thus, the ARC program is clearly an area support program that
serves to infuse a region qualifying with an average revenue deficit with some federal
support while farm specific instances on actual planting will require careful management
of crop production, marketing, and insurance coverage to provide reliable stability to
farm incomes.
The effect that yield brings to the 2014 ARC payment calculation for corn tells an
interesting story about how yield determines the geographic distribution of payments
across the state. For example, Indiana has a regional maximum of 51 dollars per acre in
the northwestern region, but the south central and southeastern regions did not receive
any payments. The wide margin results

     



 



   

average regional payment per acre for Indiana is 15 dollars per acre, but the standard
deviation is 17 dollars per acre. The large standard deviation results in a heavy right
skewedness from the average.
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Figure 3. 2 Crop Reporting District Payment Aggregates under the ARC Program for
 
    
Figure 3.2 shows the regional average actual 2014 yield on the y-axis over the
regional 2014 Y*ARC. The Y*ARC is the target yield required to trigger a payment once
prices are known6. The convergence point for each region is specified by the solid 45
degree line which puts a region squarely on the margin of receiving some positive
payments level under ARC. The dashed line at the bottom of the graph identifies the ten
percent (or ARC benchmark revenue) payment limit specified for the program.

6

These trigger yields Y*ARC are calculated from the ARC payment formula as: Y*ARC = 0.86Yb x
[Pb/Pt] where Pt and Pb are current and benchmark prices and Yb is the benchmark yield. The 0.86 factor
makes this a trigger yield as that is the proportion of benchmark revenue that defines the margin between
payments equal to zero and greater than zero.

46
There is some discrepancy between the figure and the table as the table shows
some regions receiving payments while the graph does not. This is from the table being
the average of payments and the graph being the average of yields. The discrepancy
reveals an interesting fact that the northeastern, mid central, and southwestern regions
would not have received payments if they were distributed on a regional basis.
Disregarding the discrepancy, the figure describes the effect that yield has on the 2014
payments for corn. The south central and southeastern regions did not receive payments
even with the 43 percent price deficiency because their yield was well above their local
benchmarks measured at the county level. However, all of the other regions had at least
some counties that received payments because they experienced yield increases that were
small enough to stay under the payment trigger of the ARC program.
The main way that yield affects payments that each crop and region receives is by
adding variability across the state so that differential income support is received even as
the national average price basis for marketing is identical for all places. Price mainly
affects the general level of payments everyone receives. However, yield is the only driver
of regional payment differences and in any given year is the key factor for determining
eligibility once the common price factor is identified. For 2014, yield has had a
significant effect on soybeans and wheat not receiving payments and the payment
variability seen in the different regions for corn.
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3.4: Explaining County ARC Payments for Corn across Counties
The Agricultural Risk Coverage payments for 2014 results at the crop reporting
district level can be further refined by moving to the county level where actual payments
are calculated. As stated in the previous section, many producers in certain counties
would not have received payments because other better performing counties would pull
the revenue average above the benchmark. Therefore, it is worth analyzing corn
payments on a more in depth level. Table 3.2 shows the 2014 county ARC payments
results for the northwestern, north central, and mid-east regions of Indiana.
Table 3. 2 2014 ARC County Corn Payments across Regi    
calculations)



The table shows just how varied the payment levels can be within a certain
region. For example, there are multiple counties that receive no payments while some
payments are approaching or are at their respective maximum payment level. The mideast region is particularly noteworthy for the fact that Blackford County requires a
maximum payment level while Fayette County did not net a positive payment. In
addition, none of the counties that required payments would have received them if
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payments were calculated on a wider regional basis according to figure 3.1. Similarly,
there is extensive diversity in the 2014 ARC payments in the other regions featured in
table 3.2.
Comparing the individual county ARC payments to the regional average is
another way to get an idea of how varied the 2014 corn payments were within the region.
For example, the northwest region averaged a payment of 51 dollars per acre. Benton
County was the lowest in comparison with a payment of 8 dollars per acre, which is just
16 percent of the county average. Pulaski was one of the counties that reached it
maximum payment level of 80 dollars per acre which is 156 percent of the regional
average. Likewise, the other regions share this variability. For example, the mid-east
region has counties receiving no payments and Blackford County reaching 327 percent of
the average weighted payment of 25 dollars per acre. Yield would be the driving factor
behind the variability considering prices are held constant across the area.
When compared to Direct Payments, ARC payments show a drastic variance from
the fixed decoupled program. In the northeastern region the majority of the 2014
payments were significantly above their respective yearly average support from Direct
Payments. However, Benton County received only 28 percent of their respective yearly
fixed payment that would have occurred under a continuation of the DP program. The
variance around the direct payments illustrates how the ARC program is designed to act
as a safety net and distribute support to counties that are affected most from revenue loss.
Likewise, the northcentral and mid-east regions are subject to similar discrepancies.
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Figure 3. 3 Comparison of Yield Factors for Select Counties in Indiana, 2014 (Source:

     

The effect that variance in yields versus their respective Y*ARC on payments
received between counties is illustrated in figure 3.3. The figure has pulled three counties
from each region that receive no payments, receive non limiting payments, and maximum
payments. Figure 3.3 follows the same guidelines as figure 3.2 without the discrepancy
of averages. It is clear that wide variety in yields versus their respective Y*ARC across
the counties directly influence the level of payments that each county received for 2014.
For example, the high yield for Fayette County allowed the county to be above the
benchmark and not receive payments. Several counties such as Benton, Henry, Marshall,
Koskiusko, and Blackford received payments because of their low yield relative to the

                     
low enough to surpass their payment limit revenue deficit. Counties with such large
revenue losses could be an issue because they see a lower percentage of support

           !          
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is 83 percent of the necessary benchmark, which results in 17 percent loss in revenue that
is not made up by ARC.
After the USDA makes the final calculation of payments for the 2014 crop year, it
is time to determine the benchmark for 2015. As stated in the background, the olympic
average price and yield for the past five years are the main factors in determining the new
revenue benchmark. Table 3.3 illustrates the calculation for the 2015 ARC price
benchmark of corn.
Table 3. 3

  

          

Beginning with the 2015 crop, the 2009 national price is no longer a factor in the
price benchmark calculation. However, it was excluded from the 2014 benchmark price
calculations as well because it was the lowest of the five-year price period. This
guarantees that the price support of the ARC program via the olympic average price
benchmark cannot decline from 2014 to 2015. Because the prices for 2012 and 2014 are
the most extreme of the five years, the benchmark price would be the average of years
2010, 2011, and 2013, which is $5.29 per bushel, the same as 2014. Now that the
benchmark price is determined, the yield benchmark is the remaining explanatory factor
in determining payment qualification in the 2015 crop year.
It is important to note that changing benchmarks could drive payment levels in

                    

 

enough yield growth in 2014 to limit ARC payments will necessarily have a stronger
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yield protection factor in 2015 ARC calculation

   

     

moving averages guarantees that in any year you do not receive payments you are adding
weight to the overall revenue protection level by causing a relative increase in one of the
factors used to calculate future benchmark supports7. Using the USDA estimated yields
for 2015 crop year we see that only 21 counties will have a different benchmark than
2014 for corn due to changes in the olympic average yield calculations8. Of those, only
Newton County will have a higher benchmark, and the remaining 20 counties will face a
lower benchmark. The effects of the changing benchmarks will be discussed in following
sections.

3.5: ARC Corn Outcomes from 2014 to 2015
As stated in the previous section, the ARC price protection component for 2015 is
exactly the same as 2014 for corn and soybeans and extremely similar for wheat.
Therefore, the variance in 2015 ARC payments on a county or regional basis will be
determined by the yield of the county. However, it is important to note that a significant
fall in the 2015 national price from 2014 will cause the general payment average to
increase evenly across regions for that specific crop.

7

Note that this statement while true requires a nuanced definition of protection. The 86 percent factor in the
benchmark revenue means that farms could sustain year over year losses and never meet eligibility

  !   "### $%&'( )*+ ,  %&# - '%##  " &".  *  &%*

decline relative to other areas is considered in some manner a relative increase in future support or revenue
protection.
8
For many counties the 2014 yield is the highest yield of the most recent five years and is thus omitted in
the calculation of the benchmark.
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Table 3. 4

 

            

When comparing regional corn payment predictions from the GAMS model for
2015 across Indiana in table 3.4, every region receives ARC support, and the general
payment level increases for every region. The relatively consistent payment increase is
caused by the decrease in projected prices for 2015; the projected prices used for
projections will be discussed in depth within the next section. The 2015 payment variance
across regions is not as prominent as 2014 because many of the regions are approaching
their respective maximum payment levels. However, the variance is still existent as the
south central and southeast regional payments of 10 and 16 dollars per acre are well
below the state average of 57 dollars per acre. This would cause the payment distribution
to skew to the lower side. A similar payment average and variance story is illustrated
when evaluating the 2015 county level payments in table 3.4. The price increase causes
the payment level approach the maximum level. The normal payment variance that yield
would cause in order to support counties most affected by the change in yield would thus
be truncated by the ARC payment limit. Issues caused by the changing benchmarks
relative to actual prices and yields could possibly carry on to the following crop years.
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Movements of the benchmarks along the life of Agricultural Risk Coverage will be
discussed in section 3.5.
After evaluating ARC payments for 2014 and predictions for 2015 we can see a
generally large increase in payments as a result in a drop in predicted prices. Moving on
to 2016 to 2018 predictions it is important to note the difference in information used for
the prediction. 2014 predictions were extremely certain because the USDA has already
calculated the payments. There was also plenty of information to aid the accuracy of
predictions for 2015. USDA benchmarks were available for the 2015 prediction and the
only unknowns were 2015 actual national price and actual yield. However, price
benchmarks, yield benchmarks, actual prices, and actual yield are all unknown for the
2016 to 2018 ARC predictions. Methods used to construct the USDA baseline and
payment predictions for the ensuing years will be described in the following section.

3.6: Forecasting ARC Outcomes for 2014-2018
Unknown factors such as benchmark and actual prices and yields become an
increasing prominent factor toward uncertainty moving past the 2015 ARC predictions.
The following section will discuss how the unknown factors could change result. The
discussion on how the study dealt with the limited information will be included as well.
One of the largest issues in determining ARC payments for 2016 to 2018 is
estimating the prices for these years. Table 3.5 illustrates past prices from 1995 to 2013
and the changes in prices between those years. First, a distributional analysis was
performed using @RISK on the annual change in prices. The graph results are available
within the appendix. From the analysis of the mean of differences only soybeans was
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significantly far from zero. The predicted price change moving into for 2014 was
substantially different from what was seen in reality. In addition, there is no evident trend
within the price history from visually analyzing table 3.5. For example, the first ten price
observations for corn were drastically different than the following years suggesting that
the prices were not following a specific trend. In conclusion, it was decided to resort to a
baseline approach because there is no clear direction on how to forecast national prices
from the time series data.
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Table 3. 5 1995

2013 Price Behavior (source: NASS)

                    
agricultural projection (USDA). Projected prices from the USDA were desirable because
of their convergence to long term equilibrium. Table 3.6 reveals the prices used to fill in
the necessary predicted price benchmarks and actual prices to calculate ARC payments
for 2015-2018.
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Table 3. 6 USDA Price Forecast (source: Paul 2016)

Determining the yields to use for the ARC payments projections is the next step in
completing the calculations needed to determine program payments for 2016 to 2018. A
regression analysis was performed in order to obtain reasonable yield estimates for the
projection model. Analysis of yield at the county level was first performed in order to
determine how yields were trending over time and to see if there was any differences in
the trends between counties. However, the results between the counties suggested that
 



    



  

  

 imates could be

identified. In many cases, missing values and outlier years confabulated the estimated
trend yields though corrections brought them in line.
Due to the similarities in trend yield growth and the likelihood that it is related to
technological advance and adoption, we opt to use a common trend coefficient across
counties. This offers the particular advantage of maintaining a common predictive factor
across counties going forward so that we may continue to simplify county payment
predictions using our price and yield factor decomposition. This commonality is
important for the out years when projections are required since our interest is partly in
understanding how counties that initialized ARC payments in 2014 versus 2015 differ in
t               

 to most recent

revenue factors was deemed most appropriate because of the similarity. In addition, a
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state-wide trend would allow the forecast of yields to be relatively neutral across counties
and would not use 92 separate estimates that could potentially report false anomalies and
create a yield trend that is unlikely to occur. Another addition to be made is developing
an effective yield variance factor to add to the sensitivity of the projections.
After using the estimate prices and yields to forecast the result there are several
interesting results to report. The path that ARC trigger yields travel throughout the
projection is a rather important factor in determining how ARC payments behave over
time. The projected regional average of Y*ARC values are illustrated in table 3.7.
Table 3. 7 Corn Y*ARC Projections for 2014 -  

 

  

The Y*ARC results suggest that the benchmark yields decrease over time. The
downward trend of the benchmark is the result of many counties within the region having
a low enough revenue to force the olympic average to decrease over time. The downward
effect is not initially seen in 2015 because the relatively high benchmark price from 2014
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persists until 2016. As stated in previously, high benchmark prices causes the necessary
yield to initiate payments to be relatively high. Once the USDA projected prices used in
the GAMS model begin to affect the benchmark price in 2016-2018 then the decrease in
Y*ARC starts to occur. The decrease in effect would affect the payments farmers receive
over time, and this will be discussed in the conclusions.
Table 3. 8 ARC Payments for all Crops and
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Another interesting comparison are the ARC payment results across all of the
projected years. As stated in section 3.2, several corn regions did not receive payments in
2014 while others were approaching their maximums. As seen in table 3.8, as the
projection progressed the regions that received no or small ARC payments in 2014 began
to see payment increases in 2015. The ARC payments for these regions continued to
increase until their payments for 2016 to 2018 surpassed the regions that saw the most
payments in 2014. The increase seen in these regions is an example of how high yields
can drive the revenue benchmark upward in comparison to other regions. For example,
table 3.7 shows that the regions that received small payments in 2014 were the ones that
also saw an increase in Y*ARC from 2015 to 2016. This larger Y*ARC increase both the
benchmark to receive payments but also the maximum payment level as well. Likewise,
soybean and wheat producers saw the same effect as many of the regions seeing the
majority of their payments after 2015.
A comparison between the payments per acre and revenue per acre can be made
to determine an approximate ratio of income support producers are receiving from ARC.
Table 3.9 shows the average level of payments for each program throughout the life of
the farm bill in comparison to revenue per acre.
The per acre revenues used to create this ratio is derived from the 2016 Purdue
Crop Cost and Return Guide at a discounted rate to match the payment estimations
(Dobbins et al., 2016). The fact that the guide features revenue estimates with different
soil productivity levels allows a better comparison of payments across counties with
different production rates. The resulting ratio are produced in table 3.9. The resulting
percentage of revenue ARC payment represents ranges from 13 percent for highly
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productive soils to 45 percent for the lower. The percentage ranges from 16 percent to 41
percent for soybeans and 9 to 10 percent for wheat going from high to low productive
soils.
Table 3. 9 2014-201  
    
calculations)

    

A comparison between payment levels and revenue is a good metric to determine
the effectiveness of the program at distributing support. However, a comparison against
policy alternatives is a preferable metric at determining which program is most viable and
will be discussed in the next section.

3.7: Evaluating ARC Performance against Alternatives for 2014 to 2018
Table 3.10 and figure 3.4 shows the comparative level of payments made to each
crop across the different region of Indiana. Agricultural Risk Coverage offers the highest
rate of support per acre for corn and soybeans when compared to Price Loss Coverage
and Direct Payments for duration of the bill. However, PLC offers the most support for
Wheat producers.
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Table 3. 10

         

         

ARC offers effective price support protection for corn producers because the
benchmark price was so high compared to the actual price in the initial year (Keeney et
al., 2014). This large difference allowed the program to maintain a high benchmark until
the high prices were rotated out of the calculation mix. For example, the price difference
was so vast in the 2014 calculation that yield had a 29 percent buffer before payments
would not be administered. This wide gap allowed the general level of ARC payments to
approach maximum payments for many regions and many counties to exceed the cap in
2014.
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Soybeans also featured ARC as their leading income supporter for similar reasons
as corn, but an interesting feature is that they received no PLC payments for the duration
of the program. The relatively low reference price of 8.40 dollars per bushel for PLC for
soybeans is the driving factor behind the nonexistent payments because the minimum
USDA projection is 8.65 dollars per bushel. The relative proximity of payments between
ARC and DP for soybeans is also interesting because of the fixed nature or DP. For
example the stability of DP could cause some risk averse producers to still favor that
program for soybeans.
Wheat is the exception of the crops because PLC is the largest income support
program for the commodity. The payment level can be explained by the large drop below
the PLC reference price by the USDA price projections causing the PLC payments to
exceed the 10 percent ARC payment cap. This an interesting example of how target
prices have a large effect on payment rates between programs.
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3.8: 2014 Commodity Program Mix Performance
The purpose of the analysis is to evaluate the 2014 Farm Bill commodity
programs in reducing farm subsidy spending, and the effectiveness of distributed
payments. In terms of spending on commodity programs in Indiana, Agricultural Risk
Coverage and Price Loss Coverage surpass the payment levels of Direct Payments within
many regions of the state. Therefore, the 2014 Farm Bill can be expected not to
accomplish the goal of reducing farm subsidies. However, a more in depth analysis
would have to be done to include reductions in conservation and other program spending,
and a sensitivity or variance aspect would need to be added to strengthen the conclusion.
In terms of distributing the payments, ARC effectively distributes payments to the
counties most effected by revenue loss through the varying levels of support across


               

which distributes payments regardless of each counties losses. PLC is effective at
compensating producers who face deep price losses as seen in the wheat payment
  

        

     

which would fail to increase support in the event of a collapse in prices. In conclusion,
ARC allows farmers in counties that suffer greater loss than average would be better off
than with DP, but counties that perform above normal would not. For example, table 3.11
extracts counties that show both scenarios for corn and soybeans. Similarly, PLC benefits
entire commodity producers who face a deep price deficit more than with DP, such as the
case for all wheat counties.
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Table 3. 11    

       

However, the conclusions made are excluding the influence of risk preference
among farmer                  
preference between ARC and DP is prevalent in certain counties where the difference in
payments are insignificant such as Clinton and Clay counties. However, the majority of
counties for corn and wheat skew too heavily towards ARC and PLC for risk to have
large effect. Soybean producers would be the group that would be most influenced by
risk aversion because of the similarity of ARC and DP payments.

3.9 Policy Implications
The results from chapter 3 reveal many policy implications throughout the five
dimensions mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. The following chapter will draw
conclusions for each dimension based off of the baseline deterministic results as a basis
of what to be expected in the future given that the long run equilibrium holds.
In terms of the first two dimensions, crop and program, we can conclude from
table 3.10 that corn receives the largest portion of ARC payments and wheat receives the
largest portion of PLC and overall support. Soybeans receives the lowest level of income
support from all three programs. In comparison to the control, Direct Payments, the 2014
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farm bill programs offer varying preferable support for corn based on the performance of
the region. The payments variability indicates that the programs are working as a safety
net or insurance program. Soybeans receives lower support from the 2014 programs than
the control, which indicates that ARC and PLC are acting as safety nets but would be
unfavorable to those producers depending on their risk behavior. However, wheat
receives more support that the control and most of the support comes from PLC. This
shows that the price protection from PLC was great enough for the safety net to
overcome direct payments.
Moving on to the third dimension, geography, there is a great amount of payment
variability from county to county that could cause producers to see the program as unfair.
Figure 3.3 illustrates how geographical differences in yield performances affects payment
levels. For example, producers for Cass and Fayette County could view the ARC
program as unfair because they received no support even though they saw the same prices
as Henry and Benton. Blackford producers could see ARC as unfair because they
suffered greater percentage losses than Kosciusko, but received the same level of
payment. As previously stated in the introduction of chapter 3, the geographical
differences in yield across the state of Indiana and other similar states is the driving factor
in the varying level of ARC support in any given year. The differences in historical and
current soil performance is the main reason the south central and southeastern regions
received such little support in 2014.
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Table 3. 7 Corn Y*ARC Projectio     
calculations)

     

After evaluating the results across the five dimensions of the study, a grasp on the
potential policy implications of the 2014 Farm Bill can be attained. The geographical
implications of ARC could result in lower yielding counties not receiving support in time
of high yield growth even though their revenue is still not comparable to higher yielding
areas that did receive support. In addition, the price protection relationship between ARC
and PLC could pose as a source of dissatisfaction as wheat producers mainly elected into
ARC even though PLC could be the most rewarding program. Finally in times of
continually low prices and steady yields, the moving average used to calculate the ARC
benchmark could potentially drive support levels down enough to where additional
support is needed. In conclusion, the 2014 programs have many characteristics that could
prove to be problematic in the future.
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CHAPTER 4: AFTERWORD

4.1: Price and Yield Behavior Conclusions
From the results section, it is clear that Agricultural Risk Coverage county
payments are extremely dependent on the price and yield behavior of a specific county.
In addition, the starting point of the ARC benchmarks are a major contributor to the
variance of payments between PLC and ARC payment levels, entire crop ARC payment
levels, and even between county ARC payments as well. Throughout the payment results,
interesting conclusions can be derived by the effect prices and yields have on the way
ARC distributes payments to the counties
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4.2: 2014 Farm Bill on Farm Support and Spending
In the analysis between the effectiveness in farm support of ARC and PLC, the
comparison is made to previous Direct Payments as if the program had continued. This




            buting

                   
     

            

fixed regardless of conditions and ARC and PLC varies depending on economic
                   

majority of base acres. The ratio varies from 111 percent to 145 percent of DP. The high
ratio could be the result in the projected drop in prices from 2014 to 2018, but the
variability in the levels of support suggest that ARC is more efficient at distributing
payment where it is needed. Soybeans shows a very similar result ranging from 111
percent to 142 percent of DP. Wheat however, does not show that variance with a ratio
ranging from 78 to 89 percent, however most of its support comes from PLC which has a
steady rate of 175 percent of DP. This large ration shows how the price drop results in a
larger support rate from PLC rather than a steady rate from DP. In conclusion, ARC and
PLC are more effective at serving as a safety net that DP. However, even though the
payments from ARC are larger in times of hardship than DP, the ARC payments are not
received until well after a year from harvest. This leaves the producer to incur that cost
until they receive the payment. The untimeliness of payment alongside the risk aversion
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value created by DP could cause some producers to still prefer DP based on their utility
of risk and time.
In terms of spending, evidence from the payment result suggest an increase in
commodity spending in the future. Since payment levels will be driven up by the
expected drop in prices, ARC and PLC programs will surpass the levels of direct
payments. The USDA also expects an increase in commodity spending to go with the
conclusions drawn from the projections (ERS, 2016).

4.3: Recommendations for Future Research
After the conclusion of the study, there are some recommendations to be made
going forward. First, a sensitivity analysis or an addition of a variance aspect to the yield
affect generated by ARC should be conducted to get a more in depth insight to how this
would affect counties differently. In addition, the aspect that risk aversion could have on
the preference between ARC and PLC versus fixed programs like DP would be an
interesting question to answer and would draw interest when considering policy options
in the future. Testing how ARC and PLC behaved outside of the subjective conditions
generated during the 2014 to 2018 time frame would offer a better grasp on how the
programs would behave under average conditions.
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Figure 2. 1 Figure 2. 2 History of Acreage Idled in US production (source Bruce
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Table 2. 5 Comparison of 2014 commodity program features (Source: Farm Service
Agency)

Table 2. 6 PLC reference prices in the 2014 farm bill for select crops (Source: FSA)
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Figure 3. 1 ARC/PLC payments outcomes given a 4 percent yield increase (source:
Keeney)
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Table 3. 10 1995

2013 Price Behavior (source: NASS)
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Table 3. 11 USDA Price Forecast (source: Paul 2016)

Table 3. 12 Corn Y*ARC projections for 2014 -  
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